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ABSTRACT 
The often used housing price-to-income and housing price-to-rent 
ratios are problematic in housing market analysis and may result 
in misleading conclusions. Instead, the no-arbitrage condition of 
housing market is a theoretically sound basis to evaluate if 
housing prices are misaligned. Unfortunately, empirical applica-
tion of the no-arbitrage condition has notable complications. This 
article reviews these complications and suggests some solutions to 
them. The use of implied expected appreciation derived from the 
no-arbitrage condition is recommended. It is also claimed that the 
real appreciation is better to use than the nominal one in the no-
arbitrage computations. Furthermore, the paper shows that the 
maintenance costs as a fraction of housing price vary substantially 
in time and location, which may significantly affect the 
equilibrium housing price level relative to rental prices. An 
empirical application of the no-arbitrage relation using data from 
ten Finnish cities shows that housing price level in 2007 was not 
based on high expected appreciation. This lowers the fears for a 
price bubble. 
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Housing prices have soared in most of the industrialized countries during the last decade. The 
rapid housing price increase has raised questions about the sustainability of the prevailing 
housing price levels. Given the important role that housing wealth seems to play on aggregate 
demand through its impact on construction activity, on household consumption and on the 
credit market, it is worthwhile to reliably assess the prevailing housing price level in order to 
better assess the prospects of the economy. Consequently, different institutions and 
researchers have put a lot of effort to evaluate if housing prices are at an unsustainably high 
level in a number of countries and cities. Various methodologies from econometric analyses 
to simple ratios between housing prices and some fundamentals have been employed in the 
sustainability analyses. Unfortunately, the evaluation of housing price level is anything but an 
easy task and all of the assessment methodologies have their complications. 
The econometric approach enables one to study the dynamics of housing prices, including the 
response of housing prices to various shocks to the fundamentals, and to conduct a formal 
statistical analysis. To make reliable conclusions regarding the relationship between housing 
prices and the fundamentals econometric analysis requires long sample periods. On the other 
hand, especially due to the significant institutional changes in most countries during the last 
two or three decades, it is often unrealistic to assume that the relations have remained the 
same over the long sample period. Furthermore, it is often unclear whether the selected 
econometric model properly represents the actual process behind housing prices. In particular, 
it has proven to be hard to take account of the supply side variables in an econometric 
analysis. Hence, it is complicated to base the evaluation of housing price level on econometric 
analysis. 
Because of their simplicity and appealing intuition to the general public, housing price-to-rent 
ratio and housing price-to-income ratio have repeatedly been employed e.g. by credit 
institutions and by the media to justify views concerning the sustainability of existing housing 
price level. However, there is no reason to expect that the equilibrium price-to-rent and price-
to-income ratios are constant over time. Therefore, the use of either of these simple ratios has 
got considerable problems and may lead to flawed conclusions. 
A theoretically sound basis for evaluating if housing prices are misaligned is given by the so-
called housing market no-arbitrage condition introduced by Poterba (1984). The no-arbitrage 
condition states that in equilibrium the user cost of housing should equal rental price level of a 
similar dwelling. The condition is basically equal to the discounted cash flow model. In 
addition to its appealing intuition to housing market, the advantage of the no-arbitrage 
condition is that it takes the future expectations into account by a single expected housing 
appreciation term. In general, it is easier to predict housing price movements in the relatively 
near future than to forecast changes in the rental price level far in to the future. 
Recently, the no-arbitrage condition has been utilized in a number of studies (e.g. MacCarthy 
and Peach 2004, Himmelberg et al. 2005, Girouard et al. 2006, Finicelli 2007) to assess if 
housing prices are misaligned in one or more countries or cities. Unfortunately, the empirical 
application of the condition involves several complications and all of the above mentioned 
examinations have their problems. Nevertheless, careful analysis and data selection may 
enable a more reliable evaluation of housing price level based on the no-arbitrage relation 
than based on the alternative methods. 
  1This article discusses the complications of utilizing the no-arbitrage condition in an empirical 
analysis. Moreover, a case study employing the no-arbitrage condition using data from a 
number of cities in Finland is conducted. In connection with the discussion and the case study 
some solutions to the presented problems are suggested. 
It is proposed that the implied expected future appreciation should be reported when 
evaluating the prevailing housing price level through the no-arbitrage relation. The paper 
further suggests that it is more convenient to employ real instead of nominal appreciation 
rates in the analysis. Moreover, the paper claims that the fraction of maintenance costs of 
housing prices varies in time and region. To get reliable results, the variation in maintenance 
costs should be catered for. Furthermore, if the price-to-rent ratio is employed, due to 
simplicity reasons for instance, the rental price net of maintenance costs should be used 
instead of the traditionally employed “gross” price-to-rent ratio. In growing regions the gross 
price-to-rent ratio is likely to overstate current housing price level. It is also noted that the 
differences in maintenance costs weaken the comparability of the conventional (gross) price-
to-rent figures across cities. 
According to the empirical case study housing price level was not based on high expected 
appreciation in Finnish cities in 2007. This finding lowers the fears for a price bubble. In 
addition, empirical analysis suggests that either the Finnish households’ risk premium on 
owner-occupied housing is substantially greater than the risk premium figures suggested in 
the previous literature or Finnish households have constantly underestimated the future 
housing appreciation since the early 1990s. A partial explanation for the constantly smaller 
user cost than rental cost may also be exhibited by the credit constraints. 
Previously, Girouard et al. (2006) have applied the no-arbitrage relation to Finnish data. In 
line with the results in this paper, the analysis by Girouard et al. implies that in 2005 housing 
price level was somewhat lower than its fundamental level in Finland. Girouard et al., 
however, use national level data and the analysis has also got some other complications. Since 
there may be notable regional differences in the user cost-to-rental cost ratio within a country, 
it is reasonable to conduct the examination to distinct regional housing markets as in this 
article. 
The outline of the paper is as follows. The next section delineates the price-to-rent and price-
to-income ratios in the case areas and ponders the complications of relying on such ratios. In 
the third section the no-arbitrage condition is presented and complications with its empirical 
application are discussed. The empirical case study is conducted in section four. In the end, 
summary and conclusions are drawn. 
2  Price-to-income and price-to-rent ratios 
The potential misalignment in housing prices is often assessed by simple ratios between 
housing prices and fundamental variables, such as the price-to-income ratio and the price-to-
rent ratio. Figure 1 exhibits the price-to-income ratio (P/Y), i.e. average housing price level 
per square meter divided by annual disposable income per capita, in ten Finnish cities.
1 Figure 
2, in turn, pictures the price-to-rent ratio (P/E), which equals the average housing price level 
                                                           
1 The income data for HMA are collected from the publications of the City of Helsinki Urban Facts. The income 
data for the other cities are reported by Statistics Finland. The data regarding housing prices and rents are 
described in section 3.6 and concerning maintenance costs in section 3.3. 
  2per square meter divided by the average annual rent per square meter. The dotted lines in the 
Figures show the average level of the ratios during 1985-2007. Note that two different price-
to-rent ratios are shown in Figure 2. “Gross P/E” corresponds to the ratio that is typically 
presented in various reports, i.e. ratio where maintenance costs are not deducted from the 
rental cash flow. A more justifiable ratio, however, is the ratio between housing prices and 
rental cash flows net of maintenance costs. This ratio is called “net P/E” here. 
In each of the ten cities P/E values have declined from 1985 to 2007 despite the rapid increase 
in housing prices during the sample
2. That is, rental prices have grown even faster than asset 
prices. This is partly due to changes in the rental market regulation in Finland. Lifting in rent 
ceilings started in the late 1980s and rent regulation was finally released in several stages 
during 1992-95. During the housing price overshot of the late 1980s, which followed the 
credit market liberalization, both P/Y and P/E were substantially above their average levels. 
Then, in the early 1990s, the ratios dropped below their long-run averages. Since then P/Y has 
climbed up suggesting overvalued housing in HMA and Tampere. In 2007 the average price 
of one square meter equalled approximately 17% of the average annual disposable income per 
capita in HMA. Corresponding value in Tampere was 13%.On the contrary, the net price-to-
rent ratio was slightly below its long-term average in HMA and close to its average in 
Tampere. Thus, these two often used measures give different answers to the question on 
whether housing is overvalued in these two cities. In the other eight cities the price-to-income 
ratios in 2007, varying from 10% to 12%, closely corresponded to the estimated average, 
while in most cases the net price-to-rent ratios were below the averages.
3 Note that even 
though real housing prices have risen by at least 60% in all of the cities from the bottom in 
1995 to 2007, in most cases P/Y has increased only slightly. That is, in many cities the 
income growth has almost equalled housing appreciation since the severe recession in the mid 
1990s. 
In 2007 the net P/E was at a lower level relative to its long-run average than the gross P/E in 
each of the cities. This is because the rental price level has increased notably faster than the 
maintenance costs. That is, the conventionally used gross P/E ratio is likely to overstate the 
current housing price level relative to fundamentals in growing areas, i.e. areas where rental 
price growth is relatively rapid. The impact of relative differences between rental prices and 
maintenance costs is discussed in more detail in section 3.3. 
POINT 1:  If P/E is used to evaluate housing price level, net P/E should be used instead of 
the conventionally used gross P/E, since the maintenance costs and rental 
prices do not, in general, grow at the same rate. 
 
                                                           
2 Nominal price level rose between 105% (Rovaniemi) and 229% (Tampere) over 1985-2007. The real 
appreciation varied between 20% and 94%. 
3 In the case of Vaasa (1989-2007) and Rovaniemi (1991-2007) the average values of the price-to-rent ratios are 
based on even shorter sample periods than in the other cases. 
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Figure 1  Price-to-income ratios 
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Figure 2  Price-to-rent ratios 
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Figure 2  Price-to-rent ratios (continued) 
  5P/Y works as a kind of “affordability index” of housing. However, there is no particular 
reason to assume that P/Y should be constant over time. In fact, depending on the elasticities 
of supply of labor and of supply of housing and on the driving forces behind metropolitan 
growth, P/Y can be decreasing, constant or growing in time (see DiPasquale and Wheaton 
1996, 155-165). Furthermore, the institutional changes during the sample period, credit 
market liberalization in particular, may have influenced the ratio significantly. In addition, 
Meen (1996) shows that a range of policy shock, changes in the tax regime in particular, is 
capable of shifting the relationship between housing prices and income. Hence, it is highly 
problematic to use P/Y to evaluate the prevailing housing price level. 
Theoretically, the use of P/E is somewhat more justifiable. There are reasons to assume that 
housing price and rental price levels are tightly linked. For investors rent represents the 
incoming cash flow from the housing investment. For owner-occupants, in turn, the rental 
level exhibits the cost they would face if they did not own the dwelling. In other words, rental 
price is an implicit positive cash flow for the owner-occupants. However, there are factors, 
such as the interest rates and expectations concerning income and population growth in the 
area, which vary over time and across regions and may affect the ratio significantly. Changes 
in some of these factors are likely to be highly persistent. Therefore, the equilibrium P/E may 
well alter notably over time and is not likely to be stationary. Indeed, the non-stationarity of 
neither P/Y nor P/E can be rejected in any of the cities (except for Turku in the P/Y case) 
according the DF-GLS unit root test (see Table A1 in the Appendix). Naturally, shortness of 
the sample period may affect the unit root test results somewhat. 
Finally, even if P/Y and P/E were constant over the long horizon and even if there had not 
been significant institutional alterations, it would be problematic to compare current ratios to 
the averages during 1985-2007. This is because it is unclear whether the sample represents a 
“normal” time period, i.e. whether the average ratios during the sample have equalled the 
long-term equilibrium ratios. 
POINT 2:  It may be highly misleading to base assessment of prevailing housing price 
level on the comparison of price-to-income and price-to-rent ratios with their 
long-term averages. 
The price-to-rent ratio has also been utilized to compare the housing price level between 
different areas. While the net P/E was over 30 in HMA in 2007, the ratio was less than 20 in 
Pori. Does this necessarily mean that housing prices were higher relative to fundamentals in 
HMA than in Pori? No it does not. As will be explained in the next section, equilibrium P/E is 
influenced by factors such as risk premium, expected growth rate and the share of the physical 
structure of the total housing price level that may substantially differ between cities. Hence, 
comparison of P/E values between cities does necessarily not tell us anything about potential 
misalignments in regional housing prices. Some might claim though that the 3.2% net rental 
yield in HMA is all too low for housing to be correctly priced in the area. It is not that 
obvious, however: if real housing price level stays constant, the total return on housing in 
HMA is actually 3.2% in real terms. In fact, catering for the average real appreciation rate of 
2.7% (which would lead to 6.9% real total return) in the HMA over 1985-2007 the relatively 
low rental yield does necessarily not sound all that bad. 
POINT 3:  Comparison of P/E values between different regions cannot, in general, be used 
to evaluate the ”fairness” of housing price level in any of the areas. 
  63  No-arbitrage condition 
A theoretically sound basis for the evaluation of prevailing housing price level is given by the 
housing market no-arbitrage condition (NAC). The theoretical foundation of NAC lies on the 
asset market approach of housing markets introduced by Poterba (1984).
4 The no-arbitrage 
condition states that the user cost of owner-occupied housing (U) should equal the rent (P
R) of 
a similar dwelling. More specifically: 








t + λt + Mt – it] = P
R
t, (1) 
where Mt denotes the maintenance costs of housing as a fraction of house price and it stands 
for the expected nominal rate of future housing appreciation. Mt includes property taxes and 
depreciation. Here, depreciation refers to the maintenance and repair costs that are necessary 
to maintain constant quality of the structure. The rest of the term in the parenthesis expresses 
the opportunity cost of capital. In general, only a fraction σ of the value of a house is financed 




m is the tax deductibility of mortgage interest payments in taxation and r
m is the 
before-tax mortgage rate. The opportunity cost of housing capital is completed by the after-






t is the tax rate for capital income)] on the part of 
the dwelling financed by equity plus the additional risk premium (λ) to compensate 
homeowners for the higher risk of owning vs. renting.
5 Note that all the variables in (1) are in 
nominal terms. An inflation correction is carried out in the model by the inclusion of the 
expected nominal housing appreciation. 
NAC can be used to illustrate the main problem with the price-to-rent ratio. From the 
equivalence condition in (1) we get: 
Pt/P
R








t + λt + Mt – it] = P/E
eq
t.  (2) 
It is evident that the “equilibrium” P/E, denoted by P/E
eq, is the larger the lower is the risk-
free opportunity cost of capital and the greater is the expected future housing price growth. 
Furthermore, also the risk premium and maintenance costs of housing affect P/E
eq. The 
discount rate in the parenthesis in (2) cannot, in general, be assumed to be stable over time or 
stationary. Hence, one cannot make reliable conclusions on whether housing is fairly priced 
or not solely by comparing the P/E ratio with its long-term average value. Note also that it is 
clear from (1) and (2) that the sensitivity of housing prices to changes in fundamentals, i.e. in 
factors that affect the rental price level or variables in the discount factor, is higher when the 
discount factor is low. 
POINT 4:  The sensitivity of housing prices to changes in fundamentals is greater in 
regions where and periods when the discount factor is low. 
                                                           
4 Poterba (1984) focuses on the price of housing structures only. Nevertheless, the same basic idea should apply 
(and has often been applied) to housing prices consisting of both the structure and the site. 
5 Englund et al. (1995) incorporate also a term catering for the effect of housing ownership on the wealth tax. In 
Finland, owner-occupied housing is not taxed in the wealth taxation. Hence, assuming that if the capital was not 
invested in housing, it would be invested in an investment form that is taxed in the wealth taxation, the wealth 
tax reduces the user cost of owner-occupied housing (there is an extra tax benefit). However, the rules regarding 
the wealth tax are complicated in Finland, and it would be highly problematic to try to include a wealth tax 
benefit term in (1) in an empirical application. 
  7Although NAC is typically used to evaluate housing price level from the point of view of 
owner-occupied housing, the idea also applies for investment housing. From an owner-
occupant’s viewpoint the intuition behind NAC is that cost of the same good (housing 
service) should be equal whether one owns the dwelling or not. From an investor’s point of 
view, in turn, NAC indicates that the expected return on housing equals the required return, 
i.e. there are no arbitrage opportunities. If expected return was higher than the required rate, 
investors would bid up prices back to the equilibrium. 
Unlike in the owner-occupant case, the capital gains tax is imposed on the rental returns (net 
of maintenance costs and interest payments on the loan that is borrowed to buy the dwelling) 
in Finland. Moreover, housing appreciation is taxed when a rental dwelling is sold. Hence, 
because of the tax benefits of owner-occupied housing, housing is worth less for investors 
than for owner-occupiers if the other variables in (1) are the same for both groups. Therefore, 
if housing is of equal worth to owner-occupants and portfolio investors, the required return set 
by investors has to be lower or the future expectations more positive than those of the owner-
occupants. The return required by a portfolio investor may be relatively small due to the 
greater diversification benefits gained by having multiple dwellings (and possibly also other 
assets) in a portfolio. In addition, investors may be less risk-averse than households and may 
have lower interest costs on debt. Furthermore, professional skills and scale economies of a 
large investor may lower the maintenance costs. On the other hand, turnover of tenants 
induces costs and vacancy of the rental dwellings. There are also other factors due to which 
the maintenance costs faced by landlords may deviate from those faced by owner-occupants 
(see Henderson and Ioannides 1983, Linneman 1985, Harding et al. 2000 and Englund 2003). 
Anyhow, as most of the privately financed dwellings are owner-occupied in Finland, the 
owner-occupants’ view is taken in the forthcoming analysis. 
Unfortunately, there are several complications with the empirical application of NAC. First of 
all, due to the high transaction costs and low liquidity of housing as well as due to 
households’ liquidity constraints, in reality, there can be slight divergence from the presented 
relation even if the market participants are fully rational. In particular, if households are 
tightly credit constrained, user cost may be lower than the rental cost for sustainable periods.
6 
If credit constraints are not significant, instead, the relation should hold in the long run. The 
transaction costs are far from straightforward to take account.
7 Therefore, transaction costs are 
usually ignored in the empirical analyses employing NAC as well as in the forthcoming 
analysis in this paper. A related problem is the measurement of an appropriate investment 
horizon. After all, due to the transaction costs and relatively low liquidity of housing it is 
reasonable to assume that, in general, the planned investment horizon of housing is relatively 
long. As DiPasquale and Wheaton (1994, p. 4) state, “The expected price term refers to 
current or next period price inflation only if there are no transaction costs to altering housing 
consumption. When transaction costs impede mobility, the price term must consider planned 
holding periods”. 
Secondly, the measurement of risk premium and of expected appreciation is difficult. 
Specifically, how should one estimate these two variables and are these variables constant 
through time? Also the measurement of the other variables may include some difficulties. The 
problems are similar to the other methods to assess housing prices and, as in any empirical 
                                                           
6 Meen (1990) adds a shadow price of the rationing constraint in the user cost formula to cater for the credit 
constraints. Unfortunately such a shadow price measure is not available in most countries, including Finland. 
7 Transaction costs include brokerage fees, taxes, paperwork, information gathering as well as the financial and 
psychological costs of moving. 
  8analysis, incorrect measurement of the variables may give rise to misleading conclusions. 
Nevertheless, careful analysis and data selection enables one to make relatively reliable 
evaluation based on NAC on whether housing is fairly priced. 
Notice also that the discount factor may differ between households. In the empirical analysis 
below the attractiveness of owner-occupation is assessed from the viewpoint of both existing 
owner-occupants and of potential first-time home-buyers that are living in rental housing. In 
practice, the separation is of importance only concerning the values of σ and T
m. The debt-to-
value ratio is, in general, substantially greater for the first-time buyers than for the households 
that already are owner-occupants. T
m, in turn, has been slightly higher for first-time buyers 
who buy a home for their own use than for the other owner-occupants since 1993. A great 
number of the existing owner-occupants can utilize the higher T, however, because they have 
taken their outstanding mortgages to buy their first home. In any case, it is worthwhile to 
analyse the potential first-time buyers’ view separately, since Ortalo-Magné and Rady (2006) 
show that the importance of first-time buyers on housing market dynamics is likely to be 
particularly important, at least in the relatively short horizon. 
Despite the complications, the relation between the user cost and rental prices has been 
utilized in a number of papers studying housing price dynamics or examining the fairness of 
housing prices. Below, complications regarding the empirical application of NAC are 
discussed and past empirical studies are reviewed. Furthermore, some potential solutions to 
the exhibited problems are suggested. At the same time the data employed in the empirical 
case study are delineated. The empirical analysis is presented in section 4. First, however, the 
relationship between NAC and the conventional Gordon growth model is discussed. 
3.1  Relationship between no-arbitrage condition and Gordon growth model 
The no-arbitrage condition is tightly related to the present value condition, i.e. to the fact that 
in an efficient market the price of a house must equal the present discounted value of its 
future net service (cash) flows. The two relations just present the same idea somewhat 
differently. There is a clear equivalence between the conventional Gordon growth model and 
NAC. The Gordon growth model is presented as 
P = C/(r-g) ,           ( 3 )  
where C is the first period cash flow from the asset, r is the required rate of return and g is the 
expected growth rate of the cash flows. From (2) it is easy to see that in the no-arbitrage 
relation C equals P
R, r is σt (1 – Tt)r
m




t + λt + Mt and i stands for g. 
Alternatively, M can be excluded from r and deducted straight from P
R. While in the 
conventional Gordon model it is the rental growth rate that matters, in NAC the growth 
expectations are catered for by the expected next period housing appreciation. In the long-run, 
of course, housing price growth and rental price growth are expected to be tightly related. 
The Gordon model assumes r and g to be constant over time. Since maintenance costs do not 
generally grow at the same rate as the rental prices do, the assumption of constant g is 
problematic. As already stated, in a growing metro area rental prices are expected to grow 
faster than maintenance costs (this is further discussed in section 3.3). It is easy to show that 
this would induce the growth rate of net rental cash flow to decrease over time. This might 
weaken the applicability of the Gordon model to the housing market. Nevertheless, with 
  9reasonable rental price and maintenance cost growth rates and with realistic cost-to-rent ratios 
the change in the growth rate of net cash flows is negligible.  
In the end, it is a matter of taste whether a researcher likes to approach the problem of 
assessing housing price level by applying NAC or the conventional present value relation. 
Both approaches have the same kind of complications and both are likely to yield relatively 
reliable conclusions if the analysis is conducted carefully. The advantage of NAC is in its 
intuitive appeal to housing market questions. 
3.2  Expected appreciation 
Typically, simple, often somewhat arbitrary assumption concerning the expected appreciation 
is used in the literature. Poterba (1992) and Girouard et al. (2006) assume that expected 
housing price increase equals the expected rate of overall inflation. Poterba approximates the 
expected inflation as the arithmetic average and Girouard et al. as the moving average of the 
inflation rate in the five preceding years. Englund et al. (1995), in turn, employ the average 
annual housing appreciation during the 1980s, while Finicelli (2007) proxies the expected 
capital gain as the sum of long-term inflation expectations and historical growth in real rents. 
Himmelberg et al. (2005), who include also a forward-looking component by adding the 
spread between long- and short-term interest rates in the user cost formula, use the average 
real growth rate of housing prices from 1940 to 2000 as a proxy for expected real 
appreciation. Furthermore, Smith and Smith (2006) use the same arbitrary expected 
appreciation values (in the base case 3%) for a number of different areas in the US, even 
though the actual expectations are likely to substantially differ between different regions.
8 
DiPasquale and Wheaton (1994), instead, calculate, what they call, rational expectations. 
Even these “rational” expectations are based solely on historic values of the fundamental 
variables. 
The measurement of the expected appreciation is of major importance, since different 
methodologies can lead to different conclusion about the extent of misalignment in housing 
prices. Obviously, the use of the purely backward-looking expectations utilized in several 
papers may induce misleading conclusions. Past housing appreciation or overall inflation do 
necessarily not represent well the rational expectations. For example, if housing prices have 
risen rapidly during the past few years and are currently notably above the fundamental level, 
backward-looking expectations based on relatively short history imply fast housing inflation 
also in the future. On the contrary, rational agents should take the prevailing overpricing into 
account. That is, rational agents would cater for the adjustment of housing prices towards the 
fundamental level and, therefore, the forward-looking expectations would predict a 
substantially lower appreciation figure. 
Nevertheless, because it is extremely difficult to correctly evaluate the rational expectations at 
a given point of time and because based on the empirical literature expectations appear to be, 
to some extent, backward-looking in the housing market, it is understandable that mainly 
backward-looking expectations have been employed in the user cost literature. In particular, 
the longer the horizon is, the harder it is to predict the development of the price level. The 
expected appreciation figure caters for the expectations concerning income and population 
growth (and thereby rental growth) in the area as well as for expected interest rate 
                                                           
8 Smith and Smith use the present value approach in their analysis. 
  10movements. Therefore, assuming that the expectations are not notably different from the 
historical population and (real) income growth and that nothing radical is expected to happen 
in the real interest rate level, it is reasonable to employ the average appreciation during a long 
period in the past.
9 If historical averages are utilized, i should be based on the average real, 
not nominal, appreciation. This is because inflation figures typically were substantially higher 
in the past than today. Nevertheless, a number of studies employ the average nominal 
appreciation figure. 
POINT 5:  If a historical average housing price growth rate is used to estimate the 
expected appreciation, the real, instead of nominal, growth rate should be used. 
In the analysis below, three different appreciation assumptions are employed: the first two 
assume a constant expected real appreciation at zero and at the average rate during 1987-
2007
10, whereas the third model presumes “perfect foresight” The perfect foresight model 
assumes that households have perfectly foreseen the changes in the housing prices at a one 
year horizon. 
Another option is not to set any more or less arbitrary expected appreciation value but to 
calculate the “implied” expected appreciation, i.e. the magnitude of i at which the user cost 
equals rental price level. If the implied growth rate is very high, there are concerns about 
overly optimistic expectations and thereby about overpricing of housing. On the contrary, low 
implied appreciation would suggest that the housing price level is not based on high 
expectations and, therefore, the risk of notable overpricing is relatively small. By using the 
implied expected appreciation it is also easy to see what happens if one of the variables in the 
discount factor is altered. For instance, if an agent thinks that the risk premium for housing 
should be one percentage point higher than used in the calculations, the agent can just add one 
percentage point to the presented implied appreciation figure to find the situation based on his 
own views. Similarly, one can easily get answers to questions such as “what if interest rate 
was higher” by employing the implied appreciation rate. The fact that the ratio between user 
cost and rental cost is quite sensitive to variation in factors such as the level of maintenance 
costs, risk premium and interest rate makes the use of implied expected appreciation 
worthwhile. Finally, one can compare housing price predictions with the reported implied 
appreciation to evaluate the prevailing housing price level. 
POINT 6:  It is reasonable to report the ”implied” expected appreciation when assessing 
housing prices by the no-arbitrage condition. 
3.3  Maintenance costs 
The maintenance costs are typically assumed to be a constant fraction of housing prices. In 
Poterba (1991), Englund et al. (1995) and Finicelli (2007) M equals 4%, 5.5% and 4%, 
respectively, whereas Girouard et al. (2006) set M+λ to a constant 4%. Furthermore, even 
though M is likely to vary substantially between different areas, Himmelberg et al. (2005) 
assume that M equals 2.5% in all the cities included in their analysis. 
                                                           
9 “Long” period refers to a time span of preferably several decades, or at least a period which includes several 
economic cycles. The use of an average appreciation that is based on a couple of preceding years only may cause 
significant problems, as discussed above. 
10 The average growth rates are calculated based on the hedonic price indices provided by statistics Finland. 
  11Generally it is not reasonable to assume that the maintenance costs are a constant share of the 
value of housing. Typically, in a growing metropolitan area the appreciation of land accounts 
for a significant part of the housing price growth. As it is, in general, only the structure that 
depreciates, it is likely that M decreases in the long run in a growing metro area. That is, the 
evolution of M alone can cause the gross P/E to trend upwards in to long run. Furthermore, it 
is expected that in cities with higher housing prices, i.e. higher value of land, M is smaller 
than in the regions with lower housing price level. In other words, other things being equal, 
the gross P/E is expected to be larger in bigger cities. Malpezzi (1999) finds this to be true in 
the US market. 
In this study, proxy for M is calculated as the average per square meter maintenance costs
11 of 
privately financed flats reported by Statistics Finland divided by the average sales price of 
privately financed flats in the same year. Except for the HMA, there are no statistics at the 
city level. Hence, the reported values for the corresponding greater geographical area are used 
for the other nine cities. Major part of flats in each of the greater regions is located in the case 
cities, which limits this data problem. The maintenance costs are reported annually. Hence, 
departing from the previous literature, M is allowed to vary in time. 
Expectedly, M varies substantially over time and between the cities in Finland. The smallest 
figure is 1.2% in HMA in the peak of the price overshot in 1989, while the largest M is 4.4% 
in Rovaniemi in 1995. In 2007 M was smaller in all the cities than the average during 1989-
2007, varying from 1.4% in HMA to 2.9% in Rovaniemi. This is not surprising, since housing 
prices have grown fast during the last decade while construction costs have increased only 
slightly, i.e. the share of land value of the total price of housing has notably increased (see 
Oikarinen and Peltola 2006 for the HMA case). In general, M is smaller in larger cities, i.e. 
cities with higher housing prices, as expected. 
POINT 7:  The fraction of maintenance costs of housing prices varies over time and 
between regions. This should be taken account of in the calculations to get 
reliable results. Furthermore, the differences in maintenance costs weaken the 
comparability of the conventional (gross) P/E figures between cities. 
3.4  Risk-free opportunity cost of capital 
In the literature, usually the after-tax mortgage interest rate is assumed to equal the risk-free 
opportunity cost of capital tied in owner-occupied housing (see e.g. Poterba 1991, Englund et 
al. 1995, McCarthy and Peach 2004, Girouard et al. 2006). At the same time the ratio of the 
mortgage debt to the value of the owner-occupied house is assumed to be 100%. An exception 
is the analysis by Himmelberg et al (2005), where the risk-free opportunity cost of capital is 
measured as the ten-year US Treasury rate. Himmelberg et al. use the mortgage rate only to 
calculate the tax benefit. Also they employ a 100% debt-to-value ratio, however. 
In reality, the debt-to-value ratio of most owner-occupiers is substantially below one. Even 
the first-time home-buyers usually need a down-payment. If the risk-free interest rate equals 
the mortgage rate and is taxed at a rate equal to the deduction rate of mortgage interest 





f the assumed debt-to-value ratio is of significance. In general, banks include a risk 
                                                           
11 The figures include the repairs needed to maintain constant quality. 
  12premium to their lending rates. Hence, it is reasonable to assume that in most periods r
m > r
f at 
least in Finland, where the interest rate of most housing loans is fixed only for 12 months at a 
time. Therefore, in the Finnish case the use of a 100% ratio is likely to exaggerate the user 
cost somewhat, since after 1992 T
f has equaled or been close to T
m. The distortion is 
emphasized if the housing price level is evaluated from the viewpoint of the households that 
already are owner-occupants. In Finland, for instance, the average mortgage-to-value ratio 
was approximately 24% in 2007.
12 In the first-time home-buyer case, in turn, a 90% ratio is 
employed in this study. 
Another problem is whether to use the average interest rate on the new mortgage withdrawals 
or on the whole outstanding mortgage stock. Evidently, in the calculations concerning 
potential first-time buyers it is sensible to use the rate on new withdrawals. Concerning the 
owner-occupants, on the contrary, the average rate is a more prominent stand point. Anyhow, 
the spread between the two rates is, in general, only slight. The spread (new contracts minus 
old stock) was quite large, from .71% to 1.71% during 1989-1992, however. In 2007 the 
spread was only .01%. Due to a change in tax rules in 1993, T
m is set to equal the average 
marginal income tax rate prior to 1993 and the capital income tax rate or 30% (first-time 
buyers) from 1993 onwards. Furthermore, it is assumed that the deduction ceiling is not 
binding in either of the groups. In the Finnish case T
f equals T
m with the exception of the 30% 
rate for the first-time buyers. Finally, the 12 month euribor is used as the risk-free interest 
rate. 
3.5  Risk premium 
Also the risk premium is assumed to be constant in the empirical applications. Flamin and 
Yamashita (2002), Himmelberg et al. (2005) and Finicelli (2007) assume a risk premium of 
2%. Poterba (1991), instead, uses a 4% risk premium, while Englund et al. (1995), McCarthy 
and Peach (2004) and Quigley and Raphael (2004) do not include a separate risk premium at 
all. Himmelberg et al. claim that even the 2% risk premium may be overly high. Indeed, there 
are some factors that may decrease λ. Firstly, households might derive extra utility from 
owning a house (e.g. ability to customize the interior or pride of ownership). Secondly, also 
renters confront uncertainty. Typically, tenants can expect to have to move more frequently 
than owner-occupants, and the future development of rental prices is uncertain. In fact, 
owner-occupation may work as a hedge against the risk of unanticipated future rental price 
movements (see Sinai and Souleles 2005). On the other hand, for a typical household renting 
enables better diversification of investment portfolio. Note also that the risk premium should 
be the greater the higher the debt-to-value ratio is, since the use of leverage increases the 
volatility of return on equity. 
The assumption of constant risk premium may involve similar problem to the constant M. 
Himmelberg et al. (2005) note that the risk premium is likely to be larger in cities with high 
housing prices. The rationale behind this is that in cities with high housing prices the value of 
developed land is generally high relative to the construction costs. As the value of land is, in 
general, substantially more volatile than the construction costs (see e.g. Somerville 1999, 
Davis and Heathcote 2005, Oikarinen and Peltola 2006), housing prices are likely to be more 
volatile in cities with high housing (i.e. land) prices. 
                                                           
12 Unfortunately, there is no sufficient data to estimate the loan-to-value ratio for the cities separately. Hence, the 
national annual time series is employed in the calculations. The housing loan stock statistics are reported by the 
Bank of Finland. 
  13The higher volatility in larger cities can be rationalized also through the NAC framework. 
Other things being equal, smaller M leads to smaller discount factor and thereby to a greater 
sensitivity of housing price to changes in fundamentals. Therefore, since in a growing metro 
area the sensitivity of housing prices with respect to fundamentals is likely to increase over 
time, the risk premium may trend upwards in time. On the other hand, in many cases the 
riskiness of larger cities is diminished by the typically wider economic base compared to 
smaller cities: risk related to growth of different industries is likely to be better diversified in 
larger cities. Hence, the increasing trend in the risk premium may be offset if the industrial 
mix of the city widens as the city grows. 
Anyhow, a perfect model would allow the risk premium to vary over time. Because it is 
extremely difficult to estimate time-varying risk premium reliably, a constant risk premium is 
assumed also in this study. However, due to the rental market liberalization, λ is assumed to 
be greater prior to 1993 than currently. Following Flamin and Yamashita (2002), in the 
owner-occupant case the post 1992 λ is set to 2%, whereas the pre 1993 λ equals 3%. As the 
risk premium is likely to be the larger the greater the debt-to-value ratio is, the corresponding 
risk premiums for the potential buyers are 2.5% and 3.5%, respectively. 
Obviously, the risk premiums employed in this study as well as in the previous literature are 
somewhat arbitrary. During 1987-2007 the return on Finnish housing over the 12 month 
euribor was on average 1.9% per annum. This is in line with the suggestion of 2% risk 
premium by Flamin and Yamashita (2002) and implies that the risk premiums employed in 
this study are of reasonable magnitude. 
Anyhow, as the implied expected appreciation rates are reported in the empirical analysis 
below, it is easy to adjust the results for different risk premium assumptions. One only needs 
to add the increase or decrease in λ to the reported implied appreciation value. The same, 
naturally, applies if one thinks that the risk premium should vary between the cities. This is 
one of the advantages of calculating and reporting the implied expected appreciation rate. 
3.6  Comparing user cost with rental cost 
Due to the high transaction costs and low liquidity of housing as well as because of the 
liquidity constraints faced by households, user costs may diverge somewhat from rental prices 
even if the market participants are fully rational. A large divergence, however, would imply 
an existence of housing price misalignment, assuming that the employed data is sufficiently 
reliable and the presumptions are realistic. In other words, the no-arbitrage relation implies 
that if the user cost-to-rent ratio, i.e. the annual user cost divided by the annual rental 
payments, is substantially above (below) one, housing is overvalued (undervalued). In reality, 
the exact actual ratio cannot be observed and the analysis has to be based on best possible 
approximations. 
In some cases a direct comparison between user cost and rental cost is not possible. For 
instance, Himmelberg et al. (2005) compare the user cost-to-rent ratio with its long-term (25 
years) average, since their data does not allow for direct comparison. Given that in the long 
run U should equal P
R, it may be reasonable to assume that the long-run average, indeed, 
shows the equilibrium. However, if there are price bubbles or institutional changes during the 
sample period, the estimated long-run average may be distorted. In particular, changes in 
credit availability in the form of credit market deregulation and other innovations in the credit 
  14market affect credit constraints and thereby may cause a structural change in the user cost-to-
rent ratio. Thus, if possible, user cost should be directly compared to rental cost to make 
reliable conclusions. 
POINT 8:  Comparison of the estimated user cost-to-rental cost ratio to its historical 
average may result in misleading conclusions. Hence, direct comparison 
between the costs should be made if possible. 
In the literature, the considered investment horizon usually is one year. A year is a 
considerably shorter period than the typical holding period of housing. However, the one-year 
horizon does not mean that the house will necessarily be sold after a year. It is merely the 
planning horizon employed in the calculations. The relatively short horizon makes the 
calculations simple. 
One potential shortcoming with an analysis employing NAC is the comparability of the 
housing price and rental price series. In general, the sales price data are based on different 
dwellings from the rental price data. In this study, the rental price series represent the average 
rent per square meter in privately financed rental dwellings.
13 For consistency, also the 
housing price data utilized is non-quality adjusted. The price data does not separate between 
owner-occupied and rental units. The problem is that the general quality of rental housing 
may be lower than the average quality of housing transacted in the market. Because of this, 
the perceived user cost-to-rent ratio may exceed the actual one and housing may appear to be 
more expensive than it actually is. Moreover, the rental price series represent the whole 
privately financed stock of rental dwellings, not only flats in multi-storey buildings as the 
price data does. This should not matter significantly, however, since most of the privately 
financed rental dwellings are flats in multi-storey buildings in all the cities included in the 
examination. This differs from the US case, where owner-occupied units are mostly of the 
single-family, detached unit type, whereas most of the rental units are in multiple-unit 
buildings as noted by Glaeser and Gyourko (2007). Also the other differences between owner-
occupied and rental housing, such as the quality of the neighborhood, are substantially smaller 
in Finland than in the US, which makes the use of NAC more reliable. Furthermore, the use of 
price data on only flats, together with the use of per square meter prices, dampens the 
potential variation in the quality, size and other characteristics between rental and owner-
occupied dwellings. 
In this paper, another potential source of slight divergence of the estimated user cost from the 
actual one comes from the maintenance costs. Since the employed maintenance cost figures 
represent larger areas around the cities (except in the case of HMA), they may not perfectly 
correspond to the actual values. Anyhow, the employed figures are the best approximations 
available and it is not likely that the possible inaccuracies in the estimation of M notably 
affect the reported results. 
One problem in some of the papers presented here (e.g. in DiPasquale and Wheaton 1994, 
McCarthy and Peach 2004 and Girouard et al. 2006) is the use of national level data. It is 
highly likely that at least some of the variables in the discount factor substantially vary 
between different regions and cities within a country. This is why this study conducts the 
analysis at a city level. 
                                                           
13 Both rental price and housing price data are published by Statistics Finland. 
  154  User cost vs. rental cost in Finnish cities 
In the basic form, the no-arbitrage relation includes only nominal variables. To be able to 
utilize the constant real appreciation assumptions, the following formula, which includes the 
expected inflation rate and expected real housing price growth separately is employed to 
estimate the user costs: 








t + λt + Mt – πt – It] = P
R
t. (4) 
In (4), π refers to inflation rate and I denotes for expected real housing appreciation. It is 
assumed that the households expect the overall inflation rate, measured by the change in the 
cost of living index, to equal the inflation rate during the preceding year. In the perfect 
foresight case, however, the households are assumed to have a perfect foresight also regarding 
future inflation. Following the previous literature, the considered investment horizon is one 
year in the forthcoming analysis. In the Finnish case this makes sense also because the interest 
rate on housing loans is typically fixed only for one year at a time. Hence the assumption of 
constant mortgage rate at a one year horizon is reasonable. 
Keeping in mind the complications and assumptions discussed above, the user cost-to-rental 
cost ratios are pictured in Figures 3 and 4. The curves cover 1989-2007, since the data on the 
mortgage rates are not available prior to June 1989. In equilibrium the ratio should equal one, 
which is indicated by the straight dash line in the graphs. 
Even at the zero real appreciation expectation there appear to be notable overvaluation in 
none of the cities. On the contrary, if real housing price level is expected to stay constant, 
owner-occupation seems highly attractive compared to living in a rental dwelling in all the 
cities except in HMA. At the average appreciation rate of the past 20 years owner-occupation 
seems attractive even in HMA. 
In practice, the perfect foresight assumption (Figure 4) is highly unrealistic, but its role is to 
show the user cost-to-rental cost ratios that have actually materialized. The message told by 
this model is that since 1993 the user cost of owner-occupied flats has been extremely low, in 
HMA and Tampere even negative on average. This implies that, on average, households have 
highly underestimated the future housing price growth rate after 1993. Another explanation 
would be that the risk premium for housing is substantially greater in Finland than suggested 
in the literature. This explanation, however, would require unreasonably large risk premiums 
implying that the divergence between materialized user cost and rental cost has been, to a 
significant extent, due to higher than expected appreciation rates. One further factor affecting 
the divergence may be the credit constraints faced by households. The credit constraints have 
eased during the last decade which may have contributed to the convergence of the ratio 
towards one. 
Even since 1989, a period when housing prices were at an exceptionally high level due to the 
price overshot that followed the financial market liberalization, owner-occupation has been 
profitable on average in each of the cities. Even if the time value of money is taken into 
account using a 9% discount rate
14, i.e. even if the influence of the low user costs in the later 
periods is diminished notably, one would have been better of being an owner-occupant 
                                                           
14 Approximately equal to the average risk-free interest rate during the sample plus the risk premium of 2%. 
  16compared to living in a rental dwelling, with the exception of HMA. This is, of course, 
assuming that the underlying assumptions and employed data are adequate. 
Notice that the non-stationarity of the user-cost-to-rent ratios over 1989-2007 cannot be 
rejected when employing the constant expected appreciation assumption (see Table A2 in the 
Appendix). With only 18 usable observations and a housing price overshot as well as a deep 
recession during the sample period, it is not surprising that the unit root tests cannot reject. 
With longer sample period the existence of unit root in the ratios might be rejected. It has to 
be noted, however, that due to the loosening in credit constraints there may have been a 
gradual structural change in the user cost-to-rent ratios. Anyhow, all the unit root test statistics 
concerning the user-cost-to-rent ratios are closer to the critical values than the statistics 
regarding P/E or P/Y series if the same sample period is employed. The values reported in 
Table A2 cannot be compared to those reported in Table A1 because the sample periods 
differ. 
  17HMA (0% app.)


































































































































































Figure 3  User cost-to-rent ratios in 1989-2007 in the first-time buyer (continuous curve) and 
owner-occupant (dashed curve) case based on the constant real appreciation 
assumptions 
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Figure 4  User cost-to-rent ratios in 1989-2006 based on the perfect foresight assumption 
As discussed above it is often unrealistic to assume that the expected housing appreciation is 
constant through time. Therefore, the constant expected appreciation assumption may lead to 
somewhat misleading conclusions. The perfect foresight assumption in turn, cannot be used to 
assess current housing prices since future appreciation is not yet known. Furthermore, while 
the perfect foresight model is clearly forward-looking, it is unrealistic and may lead to false 
views concerning past housing prices. 
Therefore, Figure 5 pictures the expected real annual appreciation implied by the model (i.e. 
the value of It with which Ut=P
R
t). The calculations indicate that the price level in 2007 was 
not based on expectations of rapid future appreciation. As already indicated by Figure 3, in all 
the cities except for HMA the real appreciation expectation implied by the model is negative. 
Even in HMA constant real prices are enough to justify the price level in 2007. In other 
words, without changes in the real housing price level owner-occupation appears to be 
attractive relative to living in rental housing, in general. 
The fact that housing price level is not based on high expected appreciation attenuates fears 
for a notable overpricing of housing. Obviously, the implied appreciation curves do not 
support the existence of a bubble in the market. One sign for a housing price bubble would be 
if prevailing housing prices were founded on overly optimistic expectations regarding future 
  19price growth. It has to be noted, however, that potential changes in the supply side might put 
downwards pressure on housing prices even though NAC implies that downwards correction 
is not needed. Other variables being constant, greater housing supply would lead to lower 
prices and rents in the housing market. 
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Figure 5  Expected appreciation implied by the no-arbitrage relation in 1989-2007 
Surprisingly, the computations suggest that even during the peak of the price overshot in 1989 
the price level did not necessitate huge real appreciation expectations. This may imply that the 
risk premium is actually somewhat larger in the Finnish case than assumed in the analysis. As 
explained above, one can easily see the implied appreciation expectation assuming higher risk 
premiums by just adding the extra premium to the implied appreciation rates. Note, however, 
that a significant factor contributing to the relatively low implied appreciation figures in the 
turn of the decade was the high value of T
m and T
f. The average marginal income tax rate was 
almost 53% in 1989. In 1993 the tax rules were altered and T
m and T
f dropped to 25%. It is 
likely that the high deductibility rates prior to 1993, together with relatively high inflation and 
nominal interest rates, fortified the housing price overshot in the late 1980s as the availability 
of credit increased remarkably. 
  20Note also that, due to the tax benefit, in the current environment a percentage point increase in 
the nominal interest rate and inflation leads to a .28 or .30 %-point decline in the implied 
expected appreciation in the owner occupants’ and first-time buyers’ case, respectively.
15 On 
the contrary, one %-point rise in the real interest rate causes a .72 or .70 increase in the 
implied appreciation rate. 
The first-time buyers’ curves have been at a higher level than the owner-occupants’ curves 
after 1991, since the mortgage rate on new contracts became permanently greater than the 
risk-free interest rate in 1991. In most cases the implied appreciation was relatively high still 
after housing prices had dropped substantially in the early 1990s. The figures started to 
notably decline in the mid 1990s. This was due to the rapid growth of rental prices, decline in 
M and decreasing interest rates. Owing to the considerably faster growth of housing prices 
than rental prices, there has been an upward trend in the curves since 2001. 
There does not appear to be notable correlation between the implied expected appreciation 
values and the next period actual housing price growth. In fact, correlation between the 
implied and actual rates is negative over the whole sample. This, however, is due to the 
boom-bust period during the first few years. 
Table 1 presents information regarding the computed user costs and rental costs. 
Table 1  Details of annual user costs and rental costs over 1989-2007 (% of housing price 
level) 
  Avg. actual 
user cost 
(owner-occupants) 
Avg. user cost 
(0% exp. real app., 
first-time buyers) 
User cost in 2007 





HMA 2.7%  6.6%  4.8%  5.8%  4.6% 
Tampere 3.2%  7.3%  5.3% 7.6%  5.9% 
Turku 4.5%  7.6%  5.8%  7.9%  6.8% 
Oulu 3.8%  7.4%  5.7%  7.8%  7.6% 
Lahti 5.1%  8.0%  6.2%  8.6%  7.8% 
Kuopio 4.1%  7.5%  5.6%  7.7%  6.7% 
Jyväskylä 4.3%  7.3%  5.6%  7.6%  7.3% 
Pori 5.1% 8.2% 6.5%  8.8%  8.4% 
Vaasa 4.2%  7.5%  5.8%  7.8%  7.0% 
Rovaniemi 4.1%  8.3%  6.3%  9.6%  8.5% 
 
With constant expected appreciation across cities the user cost (as a percentage of housing 
prices) in 2007 is the lowest in HMA. This follows from the fact that in HMA, where housing 
price level is by far the highest of the cities, M is the smallest whereas the other factors 
determining user cost-% are the same in all the cities. Despite the lowest user cost-%, the user 
cost-to-rental price ratio was the greatest in HMA in 2007 assuming zero real appreciation. 
This is because of the substantially higher price-to-rent ratio in HMA than in the other Finnish 
cities. 
The average actual user costs (perfect foresight model) over 1989-2007 vary between 2.7% 
(in HMA) and 5.1% (in Lahti and Pori) while the average rental costs are notably larger, from 
5.8% (HMA) to 9.6% (Rovaniemi). Since the user cost is just the inverse of the perceived P/E 
value, zero real appreciation expectation justifies gross P/E value of 21 in HMA. In Pori the 
                                                           
15 In 2007 the capital income tax rate was 28%, while the deduction rate for first-time buyers was 30%. 
  21corresponding figure is 15. If the average long-run appreciation rates were employed as 
expected price growth rates, the model would rationalize as high gross P/E value as 43 in 
HMA. Even the lowest P/E figure would be 20 (in Rovaniemi). In general, the larger and 
faster growing the city is, the smaller the user cost and rental cost percentages are. This is in 
line with the prior expectations and with empirical result by Himmelberg et al. (2005) from 
the US. 
Correlation between the materialized user cost-% and rental cost-% over time is negative and 
highly significant in all the cities. This is unsurprising, since in the beginning of the sample 
price level dropped from the overly high level resulting high user costs while the high price 
level compared to rental prices, naturally, caused low rent-to-price ratios. Similarly, when 
prices started to gradually rise in the late 1990s after the recession, user costs became small 
whereas rental cost-% was high due to the housing price overreaction downwards during the 
early 1990s. 
5  Summary and conclusions 
The often used housing price-to-income and housing price-to-rent ratios are problematic in 
housing market analysis and may result in misleading conclusions. Instead, a theoretically 
sound basis for evaluating if housing prices are misaligned is given by the housing market no-
arbitrage condition. Unfortunately, the empirical application of the no-arbitrage condition has 
notable complications. This article reviews these complications and previous empirical 
literature that has employed the condition. Furthermore, some solutions to the complications 
are suggested. 
The paper recommends the calculation of implied expected appreciation derived from the no-
arbitrage condition. By reporting the implied expected housing price growth, i.e. the 
appreciation rate at which user cost equals rental cost, a researcher makes it easy for a reader 
to adjust the results to diverging assumptions from those employed in the analysis. In the 
computations the real appreciation rate is better to use than the nominal one. During times of 
high inflation large implied expected nominal appreciation does not necessarily mean high 
current price level but high implied real appreciation does at a much greater probability. 
The paper also claims that the maintenance costs as a fraction of housing price level vary 
substantially in time and location. The maintenance cost fraction is expected to be greater in 
larger cities and, most importantly, downward trending in a growing metro area. Hence, to 
make reliable conclusions the constant maintenance cost assumption should not be used when 
comparing the user cost between regions or when studying the evolution of user costs over 
time. 
Moreover, if the price-to-rent ratio is used, for instance for simplicity reasons, to assess 
housing price level, the rental cash flow net of maintenance costs should be employed. This is 
because, in general, maintenance costs do not grow at the same rate as rental prices do. In 
particular, in a growing metro area rental prices are expected to grow faster than maintenance 
costs and thereby the equilibrium price-to-rent (gross) ratio is likely to trend upwards. It is 
also clear that, in general, the price-to-rent ratio cannot be utilized to compare housing price 
“fairness” across cities. 
The empirical application of the no-arbitrage relation using data from ten Finnish cities shows 
that housing price level was not based on high expected appreciation in 2007. In fact, in most 
  22of the cities even a 1%-3% negative real appreciation at one year horizon can justify the price 
level in 2007. The findings are in line with the calculations of Girouard et al. (2006) 
concerning the whole of Finland during 1995-2004. 
The fact that housing price level is not based on high expected appreciation attenuates fears 
for notable overpricing of housing. One sign for a housing price bubble would be if prevailing 
housing prices were founded on overly optimistic expectations regarding future price growth. 
Nevertheless, potential changes in the supply side might put downward pressure on housing 
prices even though the no-arbitrage condition implies that downward correction is not needed. 
Other variables being constant, greater housing supply would lead to lower prices and rents in 
the housing market. 
Anyhow, it appears that the rapid housing price growth since the mid 1990s has been, at least 
to a large extent, adjustment of housing prices towards the no-arbitrage relation. Housing 
prices dropped to an overly low level compared with rental prices during the deep recession in 
the mid 1990s. The notable loosening in the credit constraints during the last ten years has 
facilitated the ability of housing price level to move towards the no-arbitrage condition. 
The analysis proposes that the high deductibility rates of mortgage interest payments in 
taxation prior to 1993, together with relatively high inflation and nominal interest rates, 
fortified the housing price overshot in the late 1980s as the availability of credit increased 
remarkably. After 1992, in turn, the user cost of owner-occupied housing has been extremely 
low on average. This suggests that households have highly underestimated the future housing 
price growth rate since the early 1990s. Another explanation would be that the risk premium 
for housing is substantially greater in Finland than suggested in the literature. This 
explanation, however, would require unreasonably large risk premiums. One further factor 
affecting the divergence between user costs and rental cost may have been the credit 
constraints faced by households. 
Finally, there have been some demands for the exclusion of deductibility of interest payments 
on housing loans in taxation in Finland. If the deductibility would have been abolished in 
2007, the estimated equilibrium housing prices would have decreased by some 20% 
(assuming zero real appreciation expectation and not taking account of any supply response 
and thereby rental price response to the price decline). That is, the consequences of such tax 
rule alteration might be tremendous. 
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Appendix 
Table A1  DF-GLS unit root test statistics on the P/Y and net P/E series over 1985-2007 
City P/Y  P/E 
HMA -.34  (2)  -1.44  (2) 
Tampere .02  (2)  -1.67*  (2) 
Turku  -.21 (2)  -2.01* (2) 
Oulu  -.25 (0)  -.79 (1) 
Lahti  -.-.41 (2)  -1.34 (2) 
Kuopio  -.20 (2)  -.87 (2) 
Jyväskylä  -.34 (1)  -.95 (1) 
Pori -.42  (2)  -1.51  (2) 
Vaasa -.67  (2)  -1.07  (1) 
Rovaniemi  -.97 (0)  -1.64* (0) 
Critical value at the 5% and 10% level of significance is 1.95 and 1.60, respectively. The tests do not include any 
deterministic variables. The number of lags included in the test is reported in the parenthesis. The lag length is 
based on the general-to-specific method. ** denotes statistical significance at the 5% level and * at the 10% 
level. 
Table A2  DF-GLS unit root test statistics on the user cost-to-rent ratios employing the constant 
expected appreciation and perfect foresight assumptions over 1989-2007 
City Constant  app. Perfect  foresight 
HMA -1.52  (1)  -2.21**  (0) 
Tampere -1.43  (1)  -1.99**  (0) 
Turku -1.14  (0)  -2.04**  (0) 
Oulu  -.88 (0)  -1.70* (0) 
Lahti -1.26  (0)  -1.98**  (0) 
Kuopio -1.27  (0)  -1.88*  (0) 
Jyväskylä -1.15  (0)  -1.92*  (0) 
Pori -1.04  (0)  -2.00**  (0) 
Vaasa -1.11  (0)  -4.15**  (1) 
Rovaniemi 1.66*  (0)  -2.70**  (0) 
Critical value at the 5% and 10% level of significance is 1.95 and 1.60, respectively. The tests do not include any 
deterministic variables. The number of lags included in the test is reported in the parenthesis. The lag length is 
based on the general-to-specific method. ** denotes statistical significance at the 5% level and * at the 10% 
level. 
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